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The Nature of the Self 
The self is at once both utterly familiar and infinitely elusive. Everyone 
reading these words has a self or, perhaps more correctly, is a self; yet it is difficult to 
say what this means or amounts to, because, unlike other objects of scientific scrutiny, 
the self resists being pinned down or pointed out. In frustration, some philosophers 
have contended that the “inner I” is an illusion (Nørretranders, 1998), the product of 
outdated dualistic thinking (Dennett, 1992) or of misinterpreted personal pronouns 
(Kenny, 1989). Even granting that the self does exist (Searle, 2001; Strawson, 1997), 
two problems persist for the would-be empirical analyst: first, to define the self 
convincingly and conclusively in view of the hodgepodge of historical meanings it 
has assumed; and second, to identify worthwhile ways of studying the self in view of 
the well-established fallibility of verbal reports based upon introspection (Nisbett & 
Wilson, 1977). 
  To meet such challenges, scientifically-minded psychologists typically 
proceed pragmatically. They accept that reflexive consciousness, the hallmark of 
human selfhood, is forever likely to elude full elucidation (McGinn, 1999), but 
nonetheless note that, whatever its nature, it is still a key hub around which human psychology revolves. They maintain, moreover, that, even though the self, regarded as 
a transcendental locus, may be empirically intractable, the subordinate phenomena 
associated with it, studied in a piecemeal way, need not be (James, 1890). Praxis 
proves, for example, that self-esteem can be adequately conceptualized, reliably 
measured, and fruitfully investigated without having to specify exactly what is being 
esteemed (Sedikides & Gregg, 2003). For scientific purposes, then, the self can be 
defined as the totality of psychological processes intimately intertwined with reflexive 
consciousness. It is not so much an object of scrutiny as an area of inquiry.  
  Psychologists who study the self are consequently able to deploy a range of 
methodologies (Reis & Judd, 2000). Common experimental techniques include short-
term manipulations of self-related variables, via the staging of social situations or the 
presentation of bogus feedback (Aronson, Wilson, & Brewer, 1998). Common 
measurement techniques include not only psychometrically valid self-report 
inventories, but also objective indices borrowed from other disciplines, such as 
implicit measures from cognitive psychology (Wittenbrink & Schwarz, 2007) and 
brain-imaging techniques from neuroscience (Heatherton, Krendl, Macrae, & Kelley, 
2007). 
The Anatomy of the Self 
We conceptually dissect the self by adopting a classification scheme that maps 
on to the traditional division of mind into three faculties: knowing 
(cognition/reflection), feeling (evaluation/affect), and doing (intention/action). 
The self as knower. Compared to the rest of the animal kingdom, human 
beings possess a sophisticated intellect, with unparalleled capacity for linguistic 
invention, theoretical abstraction, and explicit computation (Pinker, 1994; Sedikides 
& Skowronski, 2003; Tallis, 1991). Moreover, this intellect combines with reflexive consciousness to generate  a rich tapestry of self-beliefs (Higgins, 1996). These self-
beliefs, in their entirety, constitute the self-concept. Psychologists study, not just the 
content of these self-beliefs, but also what properties they possess (e.g., accuracy, 
consistency, accessibility, and importance; Dunning, Heath, & Suls, 2004; Markus, 
1977; McGuire, & Padawer-Singer, 1976; Thibodeau & Aronson, 1992), how they are 
represented in memory (Klein, Loftus, & Kihlstrom, 1996), and how they are 
structurally organized (McConnell & Strain, 2007).  
The content of one’s personally important self-beliefs is what constitutes one’s 
identity. (Note: this is a psychological definition. It differs from philosophical 
definitions that attempt to answer the question of what underlies the uniqueness or 
continuity of a person, e.g., Shoemaker & Swinburne, 1984). Identity is therefore as 
varied as the content of such self-beliefs.  
Special attention has been paid to the flexibility with which people categorize 
themselves. In particular, psychologists have explored how self-categorizations can 
occur not only at an individual level (e.g., “I am this person”) but also at a collective 
level (“We are this group”) (Searle, 1995; Sedikides & Brewer, 2001), and have noted 
that either one or the other level can predominate depending on situational or cultural 
context (Markus & Kitayama, 1999; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 
1987). That said, some self-categorizations, such as those having to do with sexual 
orientation and gender identity, do seem to have biological roots: they are partly 
heritable, begin in early childhood, and resist modification (Stein, 1999; Wilson & 
Rahman, 2005). Moreover, contrary to the claims of the sociological models such as 
the “looking-glass self” (Cooley, 1902), people’s self-beliefs are less determined by 
what others actually think about them than by what they believe others think about them (Shrauger & Schoenman, 1979). Both latter lines of research suggest that self-
categorization is not determined by social context alone. 
(A word of caution is warranted here. The term “self” can be and often is used 
as short-hand for “self-categorization”. However, the convenience of the contraction 
should not prompt one to infer that the self as a whole is reducible to content of 
important self-beliefs. Rather, self-categorization is just one aspect of the self, not its 
essential feature, as the sections below will illustrate.)  
The self as feeler. People do not, like indifferent androids, process self-related 
information dispassionately; rather, they react to it affectively, delivering positive or 
negative evaluations, and exhibiting agreeable or aversive emotions (Sedikides & 
Gregg, 2003; Tracy & Robins, 2007). Moreover, the type of reaction that occurs (e.g., 
basking in reflected glory, or cringing in reflected ignominy) depends on exactly who 
the self is being compared to, and on how well that comparison person performs in 
domains of varying importance to the self (Tesser, 1988). In addition, the information 
eliciting affective reactions need not be directed at the individual self, but also at 
entities with which the self identifies: that is, to directly praise or criticize “us” is to 
indirectly praise or criticize “me”. As noted above, people can self-categorize flexibly 
with collectives beyond themselves; also remarkable is how readily partisan 
preferences for one collective over another develop (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 
1971; Greenwald, Pickrell, & Farnham, 2002). People’s level of commitment to such 
collectives, which often defies utilitarian analysis, moderates the strength and nature 
of their affective reactions to collective threats (Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 2002). 
People’s overall affective reaction to themselves—which may both direct and 
derive from their social identifications (Cialdini et al., 1976; Tajfel & Turner, 1986)—
corresponds to their self-esteem. Having high self-esteem seems to make people’s subjective lives brighter; but whether and to what extent it confers objective or 
interpersonal advantages is much debated (Baumeister, Campbell, Krueger, & Vohs, 
2003). However, it may matter not only what quantity of self-esteem people possess, 
but also what quality of self-esteem they possess—for example, how stable it is over 
time (Kernis, 2003).  
The self as doer. People do not merely contemplate themselves and then react 
emotionally; they also act. Indeed, self-reflexive thoughts and feelings arguably direct 
adaptive action. One key component of adaptive action is self-regulation. This 
denotes the executive management of spontaneous mental and behavioural 
inclinations, essential for attaining long-term goals and preserving psychological 
equilibrium. Consequently, psychologists spend time studying successes and failures 
of self-regulation (Vohs, & Schmeichel, 2007), and building heuristic models of the 
self-regulation process as a whole (Carver & Scheier, 2000). Foundational research 
also addresses the question of whether there is anything more to the exercise of 
voluntary agency than the mere attribution of authorship to the self, the deed really 
having unconscious determinants (Wegner, 2002; Libet, 1985). 
Note that self-regulation can be either direct or oblique. When direct, an 
attempt is made to manage the mind from within (say, by trying to suppress feelings 
of worthlessness); when oblique, an attempt is made to manage the mind from without 
(say, by trying to impress others to feel worthwhile). Oblique self-regulation, as in the 
example given, is often accomplished by strategic self-presentation (Jones & Pittman, 
1982), a form of impression management that highlights the interplay between self 
and society. People also vary in their penchant for presenting a polished image to the 
world, an individual difference explored under the rubric of self-monitoring 
(Gangestad & Snyder, 2000). Self-Related Motivations 
What is the psychological glue that binds the three domains of selfhood 
together? One plausible answer is motivation: when people strive after many non-
elementary goals, their self-directed thoughts, feelings, and actions fuse. For example, 
Higgins (1987) postulates that perceiving a disparity between one’s actual self and 
one’s ought and ideal selves (implicating the self as knower) leads respectively to the 
emotions of anxiety and depression (implicating the self as feeler) that then prompt 
remedial action of trying to lessen the disparity in concrete ways (implicating the self 
as doer). 
Several grand theories of self-related striving posit the existence of 
fundamental needs that must be met in order to maintain psychological stability, as 
well as motivational systems designed to service those needs. For example, 
sociometer theory posits a need to belong to significant social groups (Leary, Tambor, 
Terdal, & Downs, 1995); terror management theory (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & 
Solomon, 1997), a need to construct meaningful worldviews; and self-determination 
theory (Ryan & Deci, 2002), needs to act autonomously, accomplish goals effectively, 
and bond closely with others. All such needs theorized to be linked, in one way or 
another, with self-esteem. This in turn suggests that the motive to self-enhance—that 
is, maintain a positive view of self—is a cardinal motive, an hypothesis further 
supported by the sheer variety of documented ways, overt and subtle, in which people 
defend and promote their positive self-view (e.g., positivity bias, self-handicapping, 
and self-serving attributions; see Sedikides & Gregg, 2003, in press; Sedikides & 
Strube, 1997). However, people do not inevitably self-enhance: sometimes other 
motives, such as finding out the truth about oneself, predominate (Trope, 1982). After 
all, even imperfectly rational human beings are guided, out of pragmatic necessity, by reality constraints. Complex dispositional and situational factors determine which 
self-motive predominates in particular situations. 
One controversial question is whether people most want (a) to maintain a firm 
sense of identity per se, and so seek to reassure themselves that they are who they 
already think they are, whatever it is (i.e., to self-verify); (b) to maintain a positive 
identity, and so seek to reassure themselves that, whoever they happen to be, it is 
good (i.e., to self-enhance). Empirical research shows that, when people with negative 
self-views are given the choice, they predominantly opt for sources of information 
that confirm rather than contradict their pre-existing self-views. This finding has been 
interpreted as indicating that the motive to self-verify is stronger than the motive to 
self-enhance (Swann, Rentfrow, & Guinn, 2003). However, an equally if not more 
plausible interpretation is that people with negative self-views do not feel rationally 
entitled to believe positive feedback, and turn it down despite keenly wanting it to be 
true (Gregg, in press). 
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